Epistemism Defined Through the PhilPapers Survey – Part 3
The PhilPapers survey is a famous survey of philosophers conducted by David Chalmers and David Bourget, on two occasions – 2009 and 2020. In the below, as in part 1 and 2, I’m using the questions in the (second) survey to define Epistemism, my proto-framework for a longtermist philosophy based on knowledge as the ultimate good.
1. Metaphilosophy: non-naturalism or naturalism?
Definition: Metaphilosophical naturalism: Weak version: Science can tell us a lot about traditional philosophical debates. Philosophers should pay attention to science. Strong version: Science can supplant philosophy in some traditional philosophical debates; the other debates aren't worth pursuing.
Epistemism is strongly non-naturalist. Philosophy and science are involved in an eternal dance where philosophy leads and science follows, but as science takes over fields that were earlier the domain of philosophy, philosophy discovers new fields. Witness for example the numerous new domains of philosophy pioneered by Bostrom over the past decades. As a philosophy with knowledge as the highest good, Epistemism doesn’t hold that there is an end to knowledge. There seems no reason to assume there would be a point where all the questions have been answered and we lean back and say that was that.
2. Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?
Definition: Physicalism about the mind is the metaphysical view that all mental phenomena are ultimately physical phenomena, or necessitated by physical phenomena.
Epistemism seeks to apply a pure knowledge-based lens. It favors the views that are most coherent with our current knowledge and that of which we can gain knowledge. The problem with physicalism as described by e.g. Philip Goff (e.g. here) is that it explains the physical world very well, but only by excluding the main phenomena in our lives, which is that of our conscious experience. This is something we have knowledge of, and of course some would say it is the only thing we have knowledge of. Therefore, Epistemism cannot accept physicalism as commonly expressed that everything in the mind are physical phenomena. This clearly ignores knowledge that we do have. However, on the other side of the spectrum, there is no evidence of any dualism, so Epistemism would not introduce souls or similar. The view most aligned to Epistemism therefore is that of panpsychism, i.e. the view that elements of consciousness are pervasive and are part of nature, and Integrated Information Theory, i.e. when information gets processed, consciousness is experienced in the largest system. Epistemism is therefore slightly between physicalist and non-physicalist views, in that it sees consciousness as natural, but it cannot be said to be physical, so Epistemism comes down on the side of non-physicalism.
3. Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?
Definition: Non-cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences do not express propositions (i.e., statements) and thus cannot be true or false (they are not truth-apt). A noncognitivist denies the cognitivist claim that "moral judgments are capable of being objectively true, because they describe some feature of the world". If moral statements cannot be true, and if one cannot know something that is not true, noncognitivism implies that moral knowledge is impossible.
Epistemism is non-cognitivist, since it recognizes that moral claims cannot be proven to be true or false. This is not an area for which we can seek knowledge. It will remain a non-proven area, and would rely on something other than knowledge to be justified. Epistemism rejects the view that something other than knowledge can be used as proof.
4. Moral motivation: externalism or internalism?
Definition: In contemporary moral philosophy, motivational internalism (or moral internalism) is the view that moral convictions (which are not necessarily beliefs, e.g. feelings of moral approval or disapproval) are intrinsically motivating. That is, the motivational internalist believes that there is an internal, necessary connection between one's conviction that X ought to be done and one's motivation to do X. Conversely, the motivational externalist (or moral externalist) claims that there is no necessary internal connection between moral convictions and moral motives. That is, there is no necessary connection between the conviction that X is wrong and the motivational drive not to do X. These views in moral psychology have various implications. In particular, if motivational internalism is true, then an amoralist is unintelligible (and metaphysically impossible). An amoralist is not simply someone who is immoral, rather it is someone who knows what the moral things to do are, yet is not motivated to do them. Such an agent is unintelligible to the motivational internalist, because moral judgments about the right thing to do have built into them corresponding motivations to do those things that are judged by the agent to be the moral things to do. On the other hand, an amoralist is entirely intelligible to the motivational externalist, because the motivational externalist thinks that moral judgments about the right thing to do not necessitate some motivation to do those things that are judged to be the right thing to do; rather, an independent desire—such as the desire to do the right thing—is required.
Epistemism holds that we should accept the views that best correspond to the knowledge we have. Given that it seems we have knowledge that amoralists exist, it seems internalism can therefore not be correct. Epistemism is therefore externalist.
5. Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?
Definition: In philosophy and mathematics, Newcomb's paradox is a thought experiment involving a game between two players, one of whom is able to predict the future. There is a reliable predictor, another player, and two boxes designated A and B. The player is given a choice between taking only box B or taking both boxes A and B. The player knows the following: Box A is transparent and always contains a visible $1,000. Box B is opaque, and its content has already been set by the predictor: If the predictor has predicted that the player will take both boxes A and B, then box B contains nothing. If the predictor has predicted that the player will take only box B, then box B contains $1,000,000. The player does not know what the predictor predicted or what box B contains while making the choice.
Given that Epistemism does not see any evidence of there being free will, Epistemism will assume that the predictor is correct and will therefore pick one box.
6. Normative ethics: consequentialism, virtue ethics, or deontology?
Definition: There are three competing views on how moral questions should be answered: virtue ethics, deontological ethics; and consequentialism. The former focuses on the character of those who are acting. In contrast, both deontological ethics and consequentialism focus on the status of the action, rule, or disposition itself, and come in various forms. Deontology argues that decisions should be made considering the factors of one's duties and one's rights. Consequentialism argues that the morality of an action is contingent on the action's outcome or result.
Epistemism is a utilitarian worldview, that holds that whatever maximizes knowledge is preferable. It is therefore consequentialist in that it is only outcomes of actual knowledge being produced or preserved that matters. This also follows from the long-term perspective in Epistemism. At a scale of millennia and more, the duties of individual humans become irrelevant due to the sheer mass of people, and only larger agglomerations such as humanity as a whole become relevant.
7. Perceptual experience: sense-datum theory, representationalism, qualia theory, or disjunctivism?
Definition: According to the sense-data theory, phenomenal qualities belong to items called “sense-data.” In having a perceptual experience the subject is directly aware of, or acquainted with, a sense-datum, even if the experience is illusory or hallucinatory. The sense-datum is an object immediately present in experience. Representationalism is based on the assertion that the mind perceives only mental images (representations) of material objects outside the mind, not the objects themselves. Qualia theorists insist that experiences’ phenomenal properties can come apart from and completely outrun their representational properties. Qualia theorists account for phenomenal properties in terms of “qualia,” intrinsic mental properties they allege experiences to instantiate. Disjunctivism is a position in the philosophy of perception that rejects the existence of sense data in certain cases. The disjunction is between appearance and the reality behind the appearance "making itself perceptually manifest to someone.”
Based on our current knowledge, we can only perceive incomplete representations of the world around us. However, we don’t have any evidence that there are qualia that are needed in addition to the representation of the object in the mind. Epistemism is therefore representationalist.
8. Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?
Definition: according to the biological view, personal identity depends on the continuity of a human body or a biological organism. The body or biological organism determines the person’s identity, which thus relies on a physical continuity. Personal identity is explained in psychological terms: having conscious experiences and memories of these experiences. The debate about further facts about personal identity over time is most closely associated with Derek Parfit. In his Reasons and Persons, he describes the non-reductionist's view that "personal identity is a deep further fact, distinct from physical and psychological continuity."
Epistemism, being based on the knowledge we have, do not see any evidence for any further facts and aligns to a reductionist view. Further, being aligned to Buddhist philosophy, Epistemism holds that there is no personal identity, since the self is simply a persistent illusion. So Epistemism would hold none of the three views.
9. Philosophical methods (which methods are the most useful/important?)
The methods listed are conceptual analysis (breaking down or analyzing concepts into their constituent parts in order to gain knowledge or a better understanding of a particular philosophical issue in which the concept is involved), conceptual engineering (the design, implementation, and evaluation of concepts. Conceptual engineering includes or should include de novo conceptual engineering (designing a new concept) as well as conceptual re-engineering (fixing an old concept)), empirical philosophy (the view that all concepts originate in experience, that all concepts are about or applicable to things that can be experienced, or that all rationally acceptable beliefs or propositions are justifiable or knowable only through experience), experimental philosophy (a relatively new approach, usually understood as beginning only in the early years of the 21st century. At the heart of this new approach is the idea of pursuing philosophical questions using methods more typically associated with the social sciences), formal philosophy (the development and use of tools from logic, probability theory, game theory and elsewhere in connection with core philosophical problems concerning language, truth, knowledge and action), intuition-based philosophy (the power of obtaining knowledge that cannot be acquired either by inference or observation, by reason or experience) and linguistic philosophy (the view that many or all philosophical problems can be solved (or dissolved) by paying closer attention to language, either by reforming language or by better understanding our everyday language).
Epistemism accepts a combination of these. They are all valid approaches that can result in the generation of new knowledge. Epistemism holds conceptual analysis and conceptual engineering to be the most useful since concepts are very useful for both creating and communicating knowledge. Formal philosophy is also highly useful, as is experimental philosophy. The others are valid, but somewhat less useful. Linguistic philosophy is valid, but generates relatively less new knowledge and casts doubt about the ability to communicate knowledge. Empirical and intuition-based are also both valid, but are too limited in their respective foci on only experience and only intuition. Epistemism holds that knowledge results from the interplay between the internal and external, between the mind and its perception of the world.
10. Philosophical progress (is there any?): a lot, a little, or none?
Epistemism analyzes this from the point of view of whether there has been new knowledge created or not. Clearly there has not been no progress, as there has been much knowledge created through philosophy. Epistemism would also hold that there has been a lot of progress rather than a little, since it assumes one doesn’t need full agreement between everyone in order for something to count as knowledge. There will always be philosophers disagreeing, but any concept or theory that explains something about the world even if mostly flawed still counts as knowledge, and therefore progress.